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Abstract
Recent computer science research demonstrates that anonymized data can
sometimes be easily re-identified with particular individuals, despite companies’

SEARCH

attempts to isolate personal information. Netflix and AOL are two examples of
companies that released personal data intended to be anonymous but which was reidentified with individual users with the use of very small amounts of auxiliary data.

>>

Re-identification of anonymized data may expose companies to increased liability, as
the information may no longer be treated as anonymous. In addition, companies
may violate their own privacy policies by releasing anonymous information to third

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

parties that can be easily re-identified with individual users. The potential for third
parties to re-identify anonymous information with its individual source indicates the
need for both increased privacy protection of anonymized information and increased
security for databases containing anonymized information.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>In

2006, Netflix published customer movie-rankings data that it anonymized by

replacing names with random numbers and removing personal details. 2 This data came
from rankings customers assigned to movies while logged into their personal accounts.
Two researchers at the University of Texas were able to de-anonymize some of the
Netflix data by comparing it with non-anonymous users’ movie ratings posted by those
users in the Internet Movie Database (“IMDb”). 3 The researchers discovered that very
little information about a Netflix subscriber was needed in order to identify that
subscriber in the anonymous database.4 Given a user’s public IMDb movie ratings, the
researchers were able to uncover all of the users’ private movie ratings entered into the
Netflix system. 5 That researchers successfully re-identified a portion of the anonymized
data with individual Netflix consumers shows the potential security problems with
anonymous data.
<2>It

has long been assumed that anonymous consumer data does not need the same

protections as data that can be identified with a particular customer. Companies
sometimes sell this ostensibly de-identified information to third-party data miners, even
when the information is particularly sensitive, such as financial and health care
information. Companies with explicit privacy policies (such as Netflix), health care
providers such as pharmacies, and financial institutions like credit card companies, may
release data after it has been de-identified.
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<3>This

article explores the potential legal problems arising from the increasingly strong

possibility that anonymized information may be re-identified with a particular individual
using only a small set of auxiliary information that is publicly available. Companies which
fail to exercise reasonable precautions to protect sensitive information may violate
financial confidentiality laws or medical privacy laws. Even with less sensitive consumer
information, the loss of consumer privacy could lead to greater company liability,
particularly when companies violate their own privacy policies by releasing information
that is easily re-identified. In addition, security breaches such as the one experienced by
AOL in 2006, in which it accidentally released anonymous information that was easily reidentified with individuals, lead to negative publicity that can be costly.6

THE LAW ON ANONYMIZED DATA
<4>U.S.

law has no general right of information privacy parallel to the 1995 Data

Protection Privilege that exists under European Union (“EU”) law.7 While the U.S. has no
over-arching privacy law, there are some privacy protections for particular categories of
information under existing statutes. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)
protects the privacy of a person’s financial information under some circumstances. 8 The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) protects some kinds of financial data. 9 Medical data
is protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 10 and
children’s data by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). 11
<5>These

existing privacy regulations do not typically protect information that has been

modified so that the data subject cannot be identified. 12 The use of de-identified
financial information, for example, is permitted by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) as long as it is aggregated. However, if the information can be re-identified by
joining it with auxiliary data, it would seem to be still in the realm of sensitive
information.13 To some extent, privacy concerns in the U.S. still reflect the assumption
that if confidentiality is breached, it will be primarily through deliberate releases of
personally identifiable information.14
<6>But

even information usually given greater privacy protection may not be statutorily

protected from use by third parties if it is anonymized. For example, the GLBA requires
financial institutions to provide consumers with the opportunity to opt out of having
their nonpublic personal information shared with third parties, 15 and HIPAA expressly
prohibits such sales or any sharing of patient information outside of a covered entity
without express authorization from the patient. 16 But de-identified data is treated
differently. The GLBA’s corresponding regulations state that if information is “aggregate
information or blind data that does not contain personal identifiers such as account
numbers, names, or addresses,” it should not be considered personally identifiable
information, and is not regulated by the statute.17 If this information can be easily reidentified with consumers, should the data be treated as de-identified data? What
happens when the data does become re-identified?
<7>Privacy

concerns are arguably stronger with medical records and consumer data from

pharmacies than with other kinds of consumer data. HIPAA protects the privacy of all
personally identifiable health information.18 However, the corresponding regulations
state that covered entities can release such information to third parties if it is properly
de-identified. 19 Pharmacies commonly sell this de-identified information to data mining
companies, who in turn sell it to pharmaceutical companies. But recent concerns about
the possible re-identification of this data have prompted the enactment of state
legislation to ban this data mining of medical information; however, federal district
courts in Maine and New Hampshire have struck down recently-enacted privacy laws on
First Amendment grounds.20 A federal court in one recent case called any concern
about patient privacy “illusive,” refusing to recognize a significant risk of reidentification. 21
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THE RISK OF RE-IDENTIFICATION OF “ANONYMOUS DATA”
<8>Recent

research underscores the risk that third parties could join “anonymized” data

with a small amount of auxiliary data from another database and de-anonymize the
data. In 2007, two researchers in the computer science department at the University of
Texas published a paper entitled “How to Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize
Database.”22 Netflix, the largest online DVD rental service, publicly released a database
with movie rankings in connection with a contest. The names and other personal details
were removed from the rankings; yet the Texas researchers were able to re-identify this
information with very little auxiliary information. While the theory behind the ability to
break into the database is difficult for a lay person to follow, once the steps required to
break the anonymity of the database are disclosed, a high level of technical knowledge
is not needed to attain access to the potentially sensitive information contained in the
database.23 In addition, current tests used by companies to determine if their
anonymous databases can withstand such adversarial attacks may not be sufficient.24
Perhaps the ability of third parties to discover information about an individual’s movie
rankings is not too disturbing, as movie rankings are not generally considered to be
sensitive information. But because these same techniques can lead to the reidentification of data, far greater privacy concerns are implicated. Even as far back as
1997, a researcher was able to de-anonymize medical records by joining them with a
publicly-available voter database.25 Anecdotal evidence suggests algorithms already
exist that can re-identify patient information with prescription drug information after
third party data mining companies ostensibly de-identify the information.
<9>Sometimes

technical expertise is not even needed for a third party to de-anonymize

data. As researchers have recently pointed out, re-identification is easier when dealing
with a population that has a unique combination of identifiers. 26 After AOL accidentally
published users’ searches in 2006, reporters for the New York Times were able to take
groups of searches made by anonymized individual users on AOL and re-identify an
individual simply from the searches she made. 27 This individual, Thelma Arnold,
confirmed to the newspaper that she had made these searches. The New York Times
article also stated that bloggers were able to identify other individuals from the
searches. 28
<10> In

August 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)29 filed a complaint with

the Federal Trade Commission against AOL.
the Federal Trade Commission

Act31

30

The complaint accused AOL of violating

by intentionally or recklessly disclosing Internet

search histories of more than half a million AOL users in March to May 2006.32 Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits deceptive acts or practices affecting
commerce. 33 EFF’s complaint alleged that by falsely leading consumers to believe AOL
would protect consumer privacy, AOL violated Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
<11> In

its complaint, the EFF made detailed allegations about the sensitive information

from Internet searches AOL published. The data disclosed by AOL was publicly available
as a downloadable file for ten days before AOL removed it. 34 The disclosure made
public such sensitive search queries as “how to tell your family you’re a victim of incest,”
“how to kill your wife,” “will I be extradited from NY to FL on a dui charge,” and “my
baby’s father physically abuses me.” 35 AOL included a warning and disclaimer with this
information, illustrating its awareness of the sensitive nature of the information.36 The
EFF reviewed this information and found many examples of search histories that could
personally identify a particular AOL subscriber or household. Some of these search
histories contain personally identifiable information such as addresses, birth dates, and
Social Security numbers.37
<12> A

particularly worrisome problem with these types of security breaches is that once

an individual’s privacy is breached by re-identification, future privacy breaches become
easier. “In general, once any piece of data has been linked to a person’s real identity,
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any association between this data and an anonymous virtual identity breaks anonymity
of the latter.”38 If a Netflix subscriber’s rankings were re-identified, for example, then
that person can never again disclose any information about her movie viewing, because
it can then be traced back to her real identity using the Netflix Prize dataset. 39

CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING PRIVACY POLICIES
<13> Re-identification

of anonymized data with individual consumers may expose

companies to increased liability. If data is re-identified, this may be due to the failure of
companies to take reasonable precautions to protect consumer data. In addition,
companies may violate their own privacy policies by releasing anonymous information to
third parties that can be easily re-identified with individual users. As discussed below,
the FTC has made examples out of several companies for not properly protecting
personal data.
<14> In

2005, the FTC filed a complaint against ChoicePoint, after the third-party data

broker’s failure to take reasonable precautions to protect financial data resulted in
numerous instances of identify theft. ChoicePoint admitted that a problem with its
screening procedures allowed a group of criminals to access the personal financial
information of thousands of people, in violation of federal consumer protection law.40
The FTC filed a complaint in January 2006, alleging, among other violations, that
ChoicePoint “has not employed reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the
personal information it collects for sale to its subscribers.”41 The FTC announced a large
civil penalty for ChoicePoint: $10 million to the Commission, and $5 million to redress
consumer harms.42 These penalties were assessed because ChoicePoint violated federal
consumer protection laws by failing to maintain reasonable procedures to protect
personal financial data and by making false and misleading statements about its privacy
policies.43
<15> Most

companies are now aware of the need to adhere to their online privacy

policies and the potential consequences for non-compliance. In 1998, the FTC made a
public example out of GeoCities, which was at that time a “virtual community” that
hosted members’ Web pages and provided other services to 1.8 million members.44
GeoCities’ Web site included statements assuring members that their personal
information would not be shared without their permission. 45 However, GeoCities sold
the information to third parties, who used it for targeted advertising.46 The case settled
with a consent order prohibiting GeoCities from misleading consumers about its datacollection practices.47 This action was a message to companies that they could not
deceive consumers by posting a privacy policy and then ignoring it.
<16> Companies

that violate their own privacy policies may face liability beyond the

possibility of an FTC action. 48 State courts may adopt HIPAA Privacy Rules as minimum
standards of care for breach of confidentiality under state common law.49 If the
information released would be highly offensive or humiliating to a reasonable person and
is widely disclosed, the company may be liable for the tort of invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts.50 Additionally, if the privacy policy is viewed as a
contract, the consumer may have the ability to bring an action for contract damages.51
The policy might be viewed as an offer, for which the user’s use of the site or
submission of information is an acceptance, with either being sufficient consideration to
support the finding of a contractual obligation. 52
<17> At

this point, online consumers may expect to see a privacy policy and companies

may not want to violate these policies for fear of losing consumer trust. Companies have
learned to avoid problems by releasing data to third parties that has been detached
from personal identifiers. However, if that information can be easily re-identified with
those persons, and companies release the information to third parties even thought they
are aware that such a re-identification is a significant possibility, companies may be
liable in contract or tort. The lack of case law at this point makes it difficult to predict
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what claims a court would be willing to uphold.53 Although cases are occasionally
brought outside of the health care context, parties have so far been able to settle their
claims.
<18> The

danger of re-identification of personal information often goes un-acknowledged

by companies. On the Netflix Prize webpage, Netflix referred to its own privacy policy
and stated that since a person probably could not even identify his or her own data,
publication of the rankings created no privacy concern.54 This failure to recognize the
ability of third parties to re-identify data is not unique to Netflix; in fact, it is almost
standard in privacy policies to assert that anonymous information collected by the
company cannot be linked to personal data by the third parties receiving the anonymous
information.55
<19> Even

companies who intend to abide by the promises conveyed in their privacy

policies sometimes have trouble keeping those promises when they run into financial
difficulties. For example, Toysmart, an Internet-only retailer, had a very strict privacy
policy. 56 However, when Toysmart had to file for bankruptcy, its previously confidential
customer information became another asset that needed to be put up for sale.57
Retailers like Toysmart that are experiencing financial difficulties may need to sell their
anonymous databases of consumer information along with the personally identifiable
information.58 Even if a company selling an anonymous database has a strict privacy
policy, it is possible that the next company will not adhere as strictly to the privacy
policies of the preceding company. This is even more of a concern with health care and
financial information.

CONCLUSION
<20> The

increasing ability of third parties to re-identify anonymous information with its

individual source indicates the need for both increased privacy protection of anonymized
information and increased security for databases containing anonymized information.
Anonymous systems should be subjected to adversarial attacks to test their ability to
withstand such attacks; however, if the researchers who broke the anonymity of the
Netflix database are correct, even those tests may not be enough to ensure that
anonymous information cannot become re-identified with individual consumers. 59
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